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Abstract—Secure communication is an integral feature of many
Internet services. The widely deployed TLS protects reliable
transport protocols. DTLS extends TLS security services to
protocols relying on plain UDP packet transport, such as VoIP
or IoT applications. In this paper, we construct a model to
determine the performance of generic DTLS-enabled applica-
tions. Our model considers basic network characteristics, e.g.,
number of connections, and the chosen security parameters, e.g.,
the encryption algorithm in use. Measurements are presented
demonstrating the applicability of our model. These experiments
are performed using a high-performance DTLS-enabled VPN
gateway built on top of the well-established libraries DPDK
and OpenSSL. This VPN solution represents the most essential
parts of DTLS, creating a DTLS performance baseline. Using
this baseline the model can be extended to predict even more
complex DTLS protocols besides the measured VPN. Code and
measured data used in this paper are publicly available at
https://git.io/MoonSec and https://git.io/Sdata.
Index Terms—Performance model, network performance mea-
surements, DTLS
Transport layer security (TLS) is the workhorse of today’s
encryption protocols, securing services such as e-mail or web
communication. In 2002, TLS was standardized for protocols
such as TCP. As TLS itself relies on the reliability of the un-
derlying protocol, TLS cannot be trivially applied to protocols
lacking this capability such as UDP. Datagram transport layer
security (DTLS) – standardized in 2006 [1], revised in 2012 [2]
– solves this shortcoming, enabling secure communication
over UDP-based protocols. There are various applications uti-
lizing DTLS, for instance, WebRTC which is implemented in
modern browsers to allow latency critical, DTLS-secured VoIP
connections over the Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
(SRTP). Another area of application is the domain of the
Internet of Things (IoT) and specialized protocols such as
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP). Furthermore,
DTLS can be used for tunneling protocols, offering a simple
and encrypted service, but also lower reliability.
Every DTLS-enabled application involves a number of
essential processing steps: packet IO, tracking of state for
different connections, and packet processing which includes
the encryption/decryption of packets. In this paper, we inves-
tigate a prototype VPN gateway application which involves
these essential processing steps. At the same time, this basic
VPN application allows measuring the effects of DTLS in
its pure form, unaffected by higher layer protocols. We call
our application MoonSec. MoonSec’s modular architecture
allows benchmarking the processing steps separately to quan-
tify the individual costs of each step. As these processing
steps must be performed by every DTLS-enabled application,
the benchmarks presented in this paper are part of higher
level protocols utilizing DTLS. By adding application-specific
processing steps our model can be extended to predict the
performance of these higher level protocols.
Our paper offers the following key contributions:
• a generic model to describe the performance of DTLS
applications,
• an extension of this model to reflect the characteristics
of a DTLS VPN gateway,
• the modular DTLS-based VPN gateway MoonSec, shar-
ing its fundamental building blocks with more complex
DTLS applications, and
• measurements to quantify the effect of basic network
characteristics and the chosen security parameters alike.
The paper is structured as follows: Section I investigates
related work. A performance model for describing packet
processing applications is introduced in Section II, which
is refined to reflect the specific needs of a VPN gateway.
Section III introduces the DTLS VPN gateway MoonSec and
its measurements in Section IV where also the model is
validated. A short remark about the reproducibility of our
experiments is presented in Section V, before concluding the
paper in Section VI.
I. RELATED WORK
RFCs 5246 [3] and 6347 [2] present the DTLS protocol,
which is used across different domains:
One such protocol is WebRTC, which is included in every
current major browser implementation, and uses DTLS to
establish keys. SRTP uses these keys for the data transmis-
sion [4]–[6]. SRTP offers a service for applications like video
conferencing where simplicity and security is more important
than a continuous error-free data transmission. In light of
this, DTLS provides a service better suited for this purpose
compared to traditional TLS.
IoT is an emerging market with a need for secure protocols.
Such devices often rely on UDP for communication, making
DTLS the natural choice for encryption, thus eliminating the
need for a TCP/TLS stack [7]. Resource consumption can be
further optimized by using specialized cipher suites and pre-
shared keys [8], making DTLS an attractive protocol for such
devices.
VPNs are another application based on DTLS which usually
model the “roadwarrior” scenario, but might also be used
for site-to-site traffic. Tunneling over a reliable connection
can result in a TCP-over-TCP situation, which is shown
to deteriorate the performance of the tunneled protocol [9].
There already exist multiple VPN solutions utilizing UDP,
however, none were usable for the measurements in the scope
of this work. OpenVPN is a VPN, which can be used over
UDP, but internally uses TLS and ESP [10], [11]. DTLS
is originally designed to run on its own without requiring
mechanisms like TLS or ESP. In this paper, we want to
investigate DTLS on its own, therefore we did not further
consider the OpenVPN solution. Another widely used VPN
solution is Cisco’s AnyConnect, for which the open source
implementation OpenConnect exists. However, OpenConnect
utilizes a pre-release version of DTLS [12], [13]. We decided
that it is best practice to stick with established and final stan-
dards. Therefore, we developed a custom DTLS application,
MoonSec, which relies on the standardized version of DTLS.
MoonSec tries to resemble a generic VPN secure gateway
relying on well-established libraries such as OpenSSL imple-
menting DTLS as described by RFC 6347 [2] (see Section III).
Furthermore, DTLS is designed to run in userspace [2],
which makes DTLS an excellent fit for high-performance
userspace packet processing frameworks such as DPDK used
by MoonSec (see Section III).
Another UDP-based VPN is WireGuard [14]. MoonSec
and WireGuard have similar design goals; both are optimized
for performance and can run in userspace. WireGuard only
supports the ChaCha20 cipher with Poly1305 [15]. This cipher
suite performs well in software-only implementations, almost
tripling performance compared to AES in non-accelerated
environments [16]. Due to its beneficial properties, this cipher
suite was also integrated into DTLS [17]. Limiting the cipher
suites and possible configurations for WireGuard is done
intentionally lowering complexity, simplifying configuration,
and securing the VPN at the same time. In contrast to
WireGuard, DTLS offers the possibility for different cipher
suites and configurations to be tailored to the specific needs of
an application. This high degree of freedom for configuration
of DTLS requires a careful evaluation of security properties.
RFC 7525 [18] gives recommendations for the secure usage
of (D)TLS.
Various studies investigate the performance of DTLS-based
protocols and their security overhead. A survey by Sub-
ramanian and Dutta [19] demonstrates the costs of SRTP
compared to unsecured RTP, with higher costs in terms of CPU
usage, memory usage, and connection setup time. Alexander
et al. [20] perform an in-depth analysis of SRTP for VoIP,
comparing different cipher suites and their influence on latency
and jitter. Both presented studies try to measure overhead
for secure communication in a specific domain. We provide
basic measurements which will be used to derive a generic
model that can be adapted to a broad range of domains and
applications.
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II. MODELING
We propose a generic model for describing stateful packet
processing applications, which can handle different packet
flows individually. To construct a model, we first identify the
architectures and design principles of such packet processing
applications. This allows us to characterize the capacity of
these applications for handling different flows, which we call
scalability. We define two levels of scalability: inter-core
across different CPU cores and intra-core on a single CPU
core.
A. Inter-core Scalability
Typical high-performance packet processing applications
are scalable across many cores to leverage modern multi-
core architectures depicted in Figure 1. Received packets
are distributed in hardware to different cores via a feature
called receive side scaling (RSS). RSS can employ filters,
such as 5-tuple hashing, to maintain a fixed flow-to-core map-
ping. If the threads of such an application avoid information
sharing, which subsequently would require synchronization
mechanisms, these applications can be scaled with hardly
any performance penalties. The same technology was used
by Emmerich et al. in the MoonRoute [21] project, which
implements a high-performance software router on top of
DPDK. Similarly, mTCP [22], a high-performance user-space
TCP stack tries to keep as much data as possible local to
one core, such as flow hash tables, in order to counter inter-
core contention. Given the right architecture, MoonRoute and
mTCP show that almost perfect linear scaling with the number
of CPU cores can be achieved: twice as many flows can be
processed if the number of CPU cores is doubled.
B. Intra-core Scalability
Stateful flow handling requires state keeping for individual
flows. A basic architecture for handling flows on a single core
is shown in Figure 2. This architecture involves a data structure
for per-flow state tracking, which we call state table. The state
can be accessed by extracting a key from a received packet
such as a 5-tuple for TCP/UDP packets. Protocols, such as
QUIC, may provide a special identifier header field which can
directly be used for flow identification. A second table, called
function table, contains all functions for packet processing.
The function table is indexed using the current state of the
packet/flow as determined by the lookup in the state table.
Packet processing works as follows: the packet is received,
the current state is extracted from the state table, then the
function is executed with the packet and the current state as
arguments.
C. VPN Model
To describe the overall performance of an application, inter-
core scalability and intra-core scalability must be taken into
account. If an application follows the architecture presented in
Section II-A, the performance scales linearly with the number
of cores, which makes modeling the inter-core scalability triv-
ial. To determine the overall performance of our application,
we additionally have to determine the intra-core scalability,
i.e., the performance of a single core. Following the application
presented in Figure 2, we define four basic processing steps:
packet reception & transfer, key extraction (e.g., 5-tuple) &
hashing, state table handling, and packet processing. For each
of these steps, the costs in terms of CPU cycles are determined.
a) Packet Reception & Transfer: Gallenmu¨ller et al. [23]
describe a model for packet IO on userspace packet processing
frameworks such as DPDK or netmap. Our model follows the
same approach for reception and transfer of packets with the
cost depending on the number of packets processed instead of
packet size. This scales linearly with the number of packets
processed.
b) Hashing: Hashing the 5-tuple of flows is modeled
as a separate step and not included in the state access step
because of its importance on the VPN application we want
to model. Choosing a non-cryptographic hash function would
allow for an attacker to induce collisions in the state table.
This kind of attack is also referred to as “hash flooding” [24].
Collision handling would cause additional overhead for the
next processing step – the handling of the state table – which
offers a potential basis for an attack on the VPN application.
The strength of the hash function is, therefore, an essential
feature of the overall VPN security, which justifies modeling
the hash function as a separate element.
c) State Table Handling: Computational complexity of
this step includes memory access. This can be modeled as
two separate steps: memory allocation and memory access.
Allocation, in this context, involves reserving the memory and
inserting an element into the state table. State allocation is
done once when a new connection is created. After that, no
additional state is allocated for this connection. The memory
is only accessed and updated, but not extended. Therefore,
the overall cost of state table handling heavily depends on
the usage scenario: short-lived connections are dominated by
allocation costs happening at the creation of a connection,
whereas access costs prevail in long-living connections with a
large number of packets.
d) Packet Processing: The main task of this step is the
decryption or the encryption of the packet data. Encryption
algorithms have an inherent cost depending on the kind of
algorithm used. We model two different classes of encryption
and decryption costs – costs during normal operation and costs
for an initial connection setup. VPNs often require an initial
key exchange for a connection setup. IPsec with IKEv2 [25],
and DTLS [2] are two examples utilizing an initial public
key handshake. However, both protocols also support modes
employing pre-shared keys avoiding public key cryptography
and therefore the costs for the connection setup entirely.
III. ARCHITECTURE OF MOONSEC
The architecture of MoonSec is inspired by the model
created from the four building blocks presented in the previous
section. We selected well-established frameworks and tech-
nologies: to handle the packet IO we use DPDK [26]; for 5-
tuple hashing packets we use SipHash-2-4 [24]; we integrated
Google’s DenseMap [27] as our state table; and we rely on
OpenSSL for encryption and decryption.
DPDK implements kernel-bypass technology accelerating
packet processing in userspace. From several frameworks
available, MoonSec relies on DPDK because of its maturity
and the high performance [23]. Following DPDK’s design
paradigm MoonSec entirely runs in userspace.
As explained in Section II-C, a cryptographic hash function
is required for effective mitigation of hash flooding attacks.
The second requirement is high performance as the hashing is
performed once per incoming packet (e.g., up to 14.88 Mpps
for 10 Gigabit Ethernet line-rate). A high-performance hash
function specifically designed for short inputs like packets is
SipHash-2-4 [24]. SipHash is integrated with various software
and programming languages (e.g., Python, Rust, Ruby). Other
hashing algorithms, such as SpookyHash or City hash, may
achieve higher performance but offer lower collision resistance
which disqualifies them from being used in MoonSec.
Since connection handling involves a hash table lookup,
selecting an efficient implementation is crucial for Moon-
Sec’s overall performance. Google’s DenseMap has the best
performance among the tested algorithms. These tests were
confirmed by benchmarks done by Tessil [28].
Besides its own VPN solution, relying on TLS and ESP
(see Section I), OpenSSL offers an RFC-compliant DTLS
implementation. We chose OpenSSL [29] because it is a
mature, widely deployed cryptographic library, performing the
cryptographic operations of MoonSec.
The major improvements of MoonSec compared to the state
of the art are: RFC-compliance, a focus on high performance,
and a flexible, modular architecture constructed of four basic
building blocks.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section presents the test setup, test design and results
of our performance evaluation of MoonSec. Results are used
to create a performance model describing the costs of DTLS-
based protocols.
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Figure 3: Setup of the test
A. Setup and Methodology
The setup consists of two bidirectionally connected servers
as shown in Figure 3. One is the Device-under-Test (DuT),
running MoonSec, and the second server is used as load
generator and sink.
Both servers feature Intel XL710 dual port NICs supporting
40 Gbit/s. The DuT has one Intel E5-2620 v3 processor, which
has 6 physical and 12 logical cores with a base clock frequency
of 2.40 GHz, a turbo of 3.2 GHz, and 15 MB of L3 cache. AES
hardware acceleration (AES-NI) is disabled on the DuT for all
experiments.
All tests are conducted using Debian images with Linux ker-
nel version 4.14.0. Variables were the number of connections,
the amount of traffic per connection, and the used cipher suite.
Every connection follows the standard DTLS – establishing
keys using a handshake before sending traffic.
The MoonSec framework is configured to pass encrypted
payloads to OpenSSL, which decrypts the content, after which
it is then re-encrypted and sent back to the load generator.
Using this approach we model a DTLS VPN security gateway
(SG), which passes equal amounts of traffic in both directions.
The CPU time of functions is measured using time stamp
counter (TSC) of the CPU [30]. MoonSec follows the design
presented in Section II-A. Therefore, we assume linear multi-
core scaling, as each thread is isolated, sharing no information
between cores. To determine the intra-core scalability (see
Section II-B), we limit MoonSec to only use a single core
for this evaluation. All experiments were run on a single core
of the DuT clocked with the turbo frequency of 3.20 GHz. The
payload data was 500 B per packet. This size was chosen to be
below 576 B, the minimum packet size which must be accepted
by any receiver accepting IPv4 [31]. This avoids fragmenting
IP packets which could impact measurement results because
of fragmentation handling.
B. Measurements
Two types of tests were conducted. First, we treat the
DuT as a black box, measuring only the resulting throughput.
Second, the individual cost of different modules within the
VPN is measured and modeled.
1) Black Box Measurements: The result of our throughput
measurement is shown in Figure 4, depicting the amount
of traffic the DuT is able to process. All measurements
are performed using a single connection. The cipher suite
was AES256-GCM using an ECDHE handshake. Through-
put scales linearly with the offered traffic up to 950 Mbit/s.
Afterward, the capacity of MoonSec is exceeded, resulting in
packet drops.
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Figure 4: Resulting throughput (Tx) of the MoonSec DuT for
a given offered load (Rx)
2) White Box Measurements: The white box measurements
use the following input parameters:
• c: Number of connections
• b: Number of bytes transmitted
• p: Number of packets transmitted
There are information criteria available to compare different
models, such as the AIC [32]. Models with a lower number of
parameters are preferred over more complex models. However,
the models must not lose their predictive power due to over-
simplification. Following this idea, we show that our model
can predict the performance using only the three given input
parameters. To assess the prediction quality of our model,
we measure the difference between real and predicted values
expressed by the symmetric mean absolute percentage error
(sMAPE) [32].
Our model measures costs in CPU cycles. Applying these
costs onto a given CPU cycle budget allows a throughput
prediction for such a system. Other system bottlenecks such
as the available Ethernet bandwidth may further limit the
throughput. Such limits can be represented as fixed bounds
for performance in addition to our model prediction. For all
measurements presented in this paper the CPU resources were
the only limiting factor of packet processing.
a) Packet Reception & Packet Transfer: As explained
in Section III, MoonSec uses the userspace packet process-
ing framework DPDK for network access. Utilizing such a
framework ensures constant costs for packet IO, i.e., costs
depend on the number of packets processed, not on their size.
Literature suggests a performance of roughly 100 cycles per
IO operation, including reception and transfer [23], [33]. We
measured reception and transfer separately, showing slightly
higher costs. The average reception of a packet costs 77 CPU
cycles, transfer costs 66 CPU cycles. We attribute the increased
costs to differences in hardware and different DPDK versions.
tx(p) = p · 66 (1)
rx(p) = p · 77 (2)
Equations 1 and 2 show the average cost of packet trans-
mission and reception. As per-packet costs are constant, both
equations have p as the sole input parameter. The performance
figures for userspace packet processing frameworks, such as
DPDK, tend to be stable, rendering the calculation of an
sMAPE value redundant [33].
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Figure 5: Average costs per hashing operation (SipHash)
b) Hashing: Figure 5 depicts the costs of the SipHash-
2-4 algorithm. The hashing itself is done over a 5-tuple
(source/destination IP, source/destination port, protocol type),
which is used to map packets to connections. After an ini-
tial phase with higher costs, SipHash converges to 62 CPU
cycles per hashing operation. As hashing is done once per
incoming packet the overall hashing costs can be calculated
by equation 3, with p representing the number of incoming
packets. 5-tuple hashing is independent of packet size, leading
to constant per-packet costs.
hash(p) = p · 62 (3)
c) State table Handling: Google’s DenseMap is used for
the state tracking. Since it is an integral part of MoonSec,
we developed a model for its performance. The two important
operations in this context are insertions and lookups. Per the
hash map’s implementation, the map grows regularly if a
certain fill state is reached, resulting in a sawtooth pattern
using a log scale for state insertions, depicted in Figure 6. A
trend towards a converging behavior can be observed.
mem(c) = c · 354 + 1477 (4)
dMapS(c) = c ·
(
400 + 170 ·
(
2blog2(c)c+1 – 8
c
– 1
))
(5)
(sMAPE:15%)
Equation 5 fits the sawtooth pattern of the insertion cost.
It consists of static costs (400 cycles) plus the dynamic costs
of the sawtooth pattern on top of it. The log2 portion of the
equation stems from the growth behavior, i.e., the map doubles
its size every time it is at least half filled. Equation 5 is not
correct for a low number of connections and should therefore
only be applied to 1000 connections or more. The number
of connections c is the sole input parameter of this equation,
representing the setup cost happening once per connection.
In addition to the setup costs in the hash table, we measured
the memory allocation for the state itself. The average costs
for this operation are modeled in Equation 4. There are ap-
plications which preallocate the entire memory before starting
normal operation. If such an application design is chosen, the
memory allocation costs can be ignored during operation.
denseMapR(p) = p · 118 (sMAPE:18%) (6)
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Figure 6: Average costs per operation performed in Google
DenseMap. Minimum and maximum values are visualized
using the gray area.
Similarly, the lookup, as modeled in Equation 6, has a
constant cost, as is expected for hash tables. On average 118
CPU cycles were needed to access an entry in the state table.
d) Packet Processing: The first step of establishing a
DTLS connection is a handshake operation, which uses either
modp-based Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral keys (DHE) or elliptic-
curve based Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral keys (ECDHE). We
used three different encryption algorithms: AES 128, AES
256, and ChaCha201.
A comparison between these algorithms is depicted in
Figure 7a, with per-packet costs divided into the four building
blocks of our model. For this measurement, we used a single
connection transferring a total of 1 kB of payload. With only
very little data transmitted the costs shown in Figure 7a are
consisting almost entirely of the handshake operation. These
costs are part of the OpenSSL block, with the other costs
being almost invisible. The figure also shows that modp DHE
is about four times more expensive than ECDHE. Figure 7b
shows the behavior of OpenSSL if 10 MB data are transferred
over the connection. By transferring a large amount of traffic
per connection, the cost of the handshake is amortized over
the duration of the entire connection. Although a difference
between the modp and the ECDH key exchange is still visible,
it is not significant (Note that the scaling of the y-axis between
Figures 7a and 7b differs by a factor of 100). The fastest cipher
is ChaCha20, followed by AES 128 bit and AES 256 bit. It is
surprising, that AES 256 is only marginally more expensive
compared to AES 128, whilst working on the doubled key
size. ChaCha20 was designed as a faster alternative to AES in
pure software implementations [15]. It should be noted, that
AES-NI was disabled, therefore AES, as well as ChaCha20
ran entirely in software, without special hardware support.
While the handshake is very costly, it does not have fixed
1The used cipher suites are DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256, ECDHE-
RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256, DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, ECDHE-
RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305, and
ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305.
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Figure 7: Average per-packet costs depending on crypto algo-
rithm
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Figure 8: Average costs per connection while performing
ECDHE using OpenSSL
per-connection costs, at least not for ECDHE. Figure 8 shows
the cost of the ECDHE handshake in relationship to the
number of connections. It can be seen, that the costs are
declining with a growing number of connections. The rationale
is, that at first, a key needs to be generated, which is a costly
operation, which will later be reused for multiple connections.
Reusing the same key pair in ECDHE operations is part of
OpenSSL’s DTLS implementation. The differences between
the individual cipher suites are overshadowed by the high costs
of ECDH and therefore neglected in Figure 8.
The above findings are modeled in Equation 7, for the
handshake, and Equation 8 for the encryption during the
established connection. The CPU costs for Equation 7 are
taken from Figure 8 which results in the one-time costs for
ECDH key pair generation of 5759960 CPU cycles. A per-
connection overhead of 2325634 CPU cycles is measured. The
overall costs for the connection setup depend on the number
of connections c. Equation 8 uses ECDHE and ChaCha20
as cipher suites since they were found to be the fastest. The
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Figure 9: Average per-packet costs depending on crypto algo-
rithm without OpenSSL
average costs for these cipher suites are 12 CPU cycles per
byte. Costs for encryption are constant per byte and depend
on the amount of data to encrypt, i.e., b. These equations can
trivially be adapted to other ciphers applying the numbers of
Figure 9.
openSSlS(c) = 5759960 + c · 2325634 (sMAPE: 1.5%)
(7)
openSSlR(b) = 12 · b (8)
e) Model validation: Figure 9 shows the transmission
without the costs of OpenSSL, to make the other costs visible.
It is worth noting, that the cipher has no effect on the underly-
ing framework beyond a typical margin of measurement error.
The total non-cryptographic overhead is about 300 cycles per
packet for long running connections (see Figure 9b) and non-
cryptographic, per-packet costs of roughly 1100 cycles (see
Figure 9a) for short-lived connections. All previous measure-
ments (excluding Figures 7, 8, and 9) investigated IO, hashing
and the state table handling separated from the other parts of
the VPN application. Here we measured the application with
all parts combined, which we use in the following to validate
the proposed model:
DPDK has the same costs as predicted by Equations 1
and 2 of roughly 130 cycles. The costs for SipHash differ
between Figures 9a and 9b. The reason for this difference is
the number of iterations executed in the different scenarios.
With roughly 500 cycles and 100 cycles, the results are in
line with Figure 5. The costs for DenseMap in Figure 9b show
a running connection. Such costs are correctly described by
Equation 6. Figure 9a shows mainly the costs for a single state
allocation. As previously explained, Equation 5 does not work
for small map sizes. We assume that for small map sizes CPU
caches have a large impact on performance, therefore we could
not identify a regular pattern.
f) Comprehensive model: The model can be simplified
by combining the per-packet costs expressed by Equations 1,
2, 3, and 6, resulting in overall per-packet costs of 323 cycles
per packet. Given an average packet size the encryption costs
can also be converted to only depend on p. For our setup
we used 576-byte packets with a 500-byte payload. Assuming
costs of 12 cycles per byte payload (see Equation 8) leads
to encryption costs of 6000 cycles per byte. The overall per-
packet costs are described by Equation 9:
overallPerPacket(p) = 6323 · p (9)
For the per-connection costs we combine Equations 4, 5,
and 6. To simplify Equation 5, we always assume the worst
case of the sawtooth pattern leading to costs of 570 cycles per
connection. The overall per-connection costs are expressed in
Equation 10:
overallPerCon(p) = 5761437 + 2326558 · c (10)
The final model is expressed by Equation 11, which only
requires two input parameters to predict the performance of
MoonSec.
overallC(c, p) = 5761437 + 2326558 · c + 6323 · p (11)
Note that Equation 11 is only valid for long runtimes
involving more than 1000 connections. For fewer or short-
lived connections the parameters have to be adapted. This
equation emphasizes the high initial costs for connection setup
compared to the lower per-packet costs. For efficient resource
usage connections should always be long running to amortize
these costs.
C. Value & Limits of the model
Equation 11 depicts a clear trend demonstrating that the
per-connection overhead surpasses the per-byte costs by a
factor of 368. These parameters were determined through
a series of experiments performed on an Intel CPU which
limits the predictive power of our model to this specific
architecture. However, we consider the factor to be big enough
to demonstrate a general trend – the per-connection setup costs
are considerably more expensive than the per-packet costs.
Therefore, we assume this trend to be true even for other
CPU architectures as it is rather a result of the performed
source code than the CPU architecture in use. To transfer our
model to different target architectures, our benchmarks have to
be repeated on these platforms. After that, the CPU-specific
costs for the target platform are known and the model can
be adapted. To simplify this process, we release MoonSec as
open source including measurements and plotting scripts.
V. REPRODUCIBILITY
As part of an ongoing effort to foster reproducible research
in computer science we want to release our data to interested
parties: the source code is licensed under open sources licenses
(BSD-3, MIT), and available on https://git.io/MoonSec. In
addition to the source code, the measured data which was
analyzed in this paper is made available on https://git.io/Sdata
including the scripts for generating all plots used in this paper.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a DTLS performance model
consisting of four basic building blocks describing the main
cost factors of a DTLS-based application – packet IO, crypto-
graphic hashing, state handling, and cryptographic processing
costs. We implemented a high-performance VPN, MoonSec,
to validate the modeled findings. Applying our model, we
identified the cryptographic operations being the main cost
factor. There is a measurable influence of the cryptographic
algorithm on the resulting costs. Costs can be halved between
the most expensive and the least expensive of the investigated
state-of-the-art encryption algorithms at least for non-hardware
accelerated ones. Handshakes are even costlier, with the modp-
based DHE ciphers almost quadrupling the costs of the more
cost-efficient elliptic curve based DHE ciphers. Therefore,
we recommend using elliptic curve based cipher suites with
ChaCha20 as an encryption algorithm. The performance im-
provement can be significant, especially considering the high
relative costs of the handshake for short-lived connections.
Beneath the encryption software layer, the powerful VPN
application MoonSec was built, relying on state-of-the-art
frameworks and libraries. This ensures the model to reflect
the high performance which can be achieved by modern ap-
plications. This framework features a scalable, multi-threaded
architecture running on top of DPDK, using DenseMap for
efficient connection state tracking, while mitigating hash
flooding attacks by implementing the cryptographic SipHash.
OpenSSL, a well-known cryptographic library supporting
DTLS, handles encryption and decryption.
Our measurements were performed on powerful servers in
high-load scenarios. However, DTLS is applied across differ-
ent domains. In other domains, additional resource constraints
beyond mere CPU usage may apply. For future work, we want
to extend our model to reflect different CPU architectures
involving additional parameters, e.g., memory consumption
or energy consumption, which are highly relevant for DTLS
target domains like mobile devices or IoT applications.
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